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Abstract: When contentious blasphemy laws are pressed into service in
fledgling democracies with illiberal tendencies such as Indonesia, critical
questions arise about judicial integrity and the political nature of blasphemy
trials. Judicial legitimacy in Indonesia is defined according to international
standards and conventions. The focus is on judicial propriety rather than the
popularity or majoritarian appeal of court decisions. In May 2017 a watershed
moment occurred in Indonesia as the former governor of Jakarta Basuki
Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok) was found guilty of desecrating
religion and sentenced to 2 years in prison. Judgments rendered in politicized
blasphemy trials such as these fail to meet standards of impartiality, and when
discursive transgressions of a blasphemous nature occur there are deep
ambiguities of meaning and intent. This paper contends that the revival of
blasphemy as a punishable crime relates to political power calculations and
electoral opportunities, and offers an analysis of blasphemy in Indonesia
through the quasi-historical lens of a discursive crime premised on the fallacy
that religious offence threatens public order. Blasphemy trials are further
complicated by the fact that religious authorities and Islamic mass
organizations in Indonesia have significant influence over judicial processes.
On May 9, 2017 a watershed moment occurred in Indonesia as the former
governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok)
was found guilty of desecrating religion and sentenced to 2 years in prison.
The blasphemous transgression occurred during a public address at a
fishing auction on Pramuka Island, north of the capital Jakarta, during
Purnama’s 2016 gubernatorial election campaign. As stated in the 636
page North Jakarta District Court decision, the accused intentionally
insulted religious leaders and a community of believers, and this deliberate
desecration of religion threatens public order.1 On his remission from
Depok’s Mako Brimob prison in January 2019 Purnama struck a
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conciliatory tone. In a hand-written letter published on his Instagram
account on January 18, he accepts that it is best to avoid blasphemy
charges, rather than challenge the legitimacy of these laws.2 In a further
plot twist, Purnama thanks God for his election loss and incarceration,
stating that he has learned to avoid being rude and arrogant. Purnama
has ostensibly come to accept his own guilt, if we take his prison letter
at face value, but the risk of capitulation is the emboldening of those
willing to accuse high-profile public figures of blasphemy, while taking
extrajudicial measures such as mass demonstrations to help achieve a
guilty verdict.
Discussions of blasphemy in Indonesia begin with the recognition of
the Dutch civil law inheritance. After independence in 1945 the
Republic of Indonesia became the largest civil law jurisdiction in the
world. Though generally considered more rigid than common law
systems, code-based reforms within civil law systems can produce trans-
formational outcomes (Strang 2008). In Indonesia today there is an
effort to reclaim history by revising the Dutch-era criminal code, though
it is unclear what kind of change to legal culture this entails, and
doubts remain about the liberal nature of legal elites given that minority
and women’s rights are being limited and blasphemy provisions expanded
under current legislative proposals (Harsono 2019). When contentious
blasphemy laws are pressed into service in fledgling democracies with
illiberal tendencies such as Indonesia, critical questions arise about judi-
cial integrity and the political nature of blasphemy trials. Judicial legiti-
macy in Indonesia is defined according to international standards and
conventions. The focus is on judicial propriety rather than the popularity
or majoritarian appeal of court decisions. The judgments rendered in polit-
icized blasphemy trials are not impartial and independent, and when dis-
cursive transgressions of a blasphemous nature occur there are deep
ambiguities of meaning and intent.
This paper contends that the revival of blasphemy as a punishable crime
relates to political power calculations and electoral opportunities, and
offers an analysis of blasphemy in Indonesia through the quasi-historical
lens of a discursive crime premised on the fallacy that religious offence
threatens public order. Blasphemy trials are further complicated by the
fact that religious authorities and Islamic mass organizations in
Indonesia have significant influence over judicial processes. Take for
instance the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama
Indonesia, MUI), an advisory body that has been growing in prominence
alongside the Ministry of Religious Affairs since democratization in 1998.
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The conservative MUI has the power to shape Islamic legal traditions,
produce fatwa, and control Islamic finance, in a process Lindsey (2012)
refers to as “monopolizing Islam.”
The conviction of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is an example of a high-
profile politician becoming ensnared in a religious scandal at a time
when a risk-averse incumbent president lays the groundwork for re-elec-
tion. President Joko Widodo’s 2019 campaign required complex bargain-
ing with Islamic parties in his coalition. The jostling for power and
influence under Indonesian democracy enables outcomes such as the
2010, 2013, and 2018 Constitutional Court decisions to retain Article
156a of the Criminal Code concerning blasphemy, where testimony
from Islamic clerics and scholars heavily sways opinion and is seldom
refuted or contradicted by authorities. A situation emerges where religious
differences are represented by Islamist groups and even some ministers as
“deviation” that can be a source of public disorder (Bagir 2013, 3), raising
questions of bias and undue influence leading to judicial impropriety.
This paper begins with an examination of blasphemy in comparative
historical context, highlighting the risk of complex discursive crimes
assuming a despotic power that has profound political and legal effects.
One notable risk is the use of blasphemy as a pretext for convictions
and reprisals by agents competing for popularity, political influence,
and access to the state. The substantive sections of the paper address con-
cerns about judicial procedure and propriety, and demonstrate why blas-
phemy trials are politicized and thus undermine law enforcement. The
approach taken in this paper is that monotheisms are heavily logocentric
in their imagining of the profane. All religions “prohibit the greatest prof-
anation they can imagine,” and while much of the literature focuses on the
Christian world, there are long histories of blasphemy in Buddhist, Hindu,
and Islamic traditions (Lawton 1993, 6). Logocentric dialog that defines
and focuses on a concept itself, such as the meaning of blasphemy, is
arguably of less concern than anthropocentric dialog, the practice of rede-
fining or modifying oneself through dialog about an external object such
as blasphemy (Stanghellini 2017, 194). This discursive approach is rele-
vant to politically active Islamist groups such as the conservative
Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI) who link behavioral mod-
ification (doubt, insult) to public disorder and societal collapse. These
actors respond by issuing legal interpretations ( fatwa) endorsing blas-
phemy charges, by exerting pressure on jurists, police, and politicians,
and by influencing electoral outcomes through mass mobilizations.
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BLASPHEMY IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
In a global comparative study by Freedom House, blasphemy laws are
found to be imprecise, leaving “enormous discretion in the hands of pros-
ecutors, judges, and accusers who may be influenced by political or per-
sonal priorities,” which is borne out by the evidence in Indonesia
(Freedom House 2010, 3). A comparison of Algeria, Egypt, Greece,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Poland shows blasphemy laws to be
“vaguely worded and ill-defined,” rendering the laws prone to arbitrary
application, a situation that “typically give rise to the violation, not the
protection, of fundamental human rights” (Freedom House 2010, 1–2).
The Pew Research Center (Theodorou 2016) and the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom (Fiss and Kestenbaum 2017) find
blasphemy laws in 71 of the world’s countries and territories.
Blasphemy laws are often vague and difficult to code for analytical pur-
poses, but the general finding is that they deviate from international
legal standards on human rights and free expression.3 Iran and Pakistan
have the most severe prohibitions on blasphemy that result in discrimina-
tion and abuses of power (Fiss and Kestenbaum 2017, 19), with cases
such as the 2011 assassination of former Punjab governor Salman
Taseer igniting intense political debate.
The political revival of blasphemy in Indonesia coincides with the
country’s democratic transition after the resignation of President Suharto
in May 1998. Blasphemy prosecutions may seem perplexing given that
democratic transitions are generally expected to improve civil rights and
standards of justice. As Peterson (2018) finds, an active and illiberal blas-
phemy law is often used to stifle public criticism of religion in Indonesia.
The complex nature of blasphemy means that those who feel judicial pro-
cesses are tarnished, or punishments are unfair, cannot publicly deny the
existence of the crime of blasphemy.
Charges of blasphemy and defamation are similar in that they are
complex discursive crimes; immaterial, subjective, and potentially bound-
less (Streckfuss 2011, 21). According to Joss Marsh (1998, 7), “blas-
phemy marks the moving boundary line between the permissible and
the prohibited,” raising the problematic question of who serves as the
final legal or moral arbiter in such cases. The risk with laws preventing
religious offence is that they have “no rational boundaries” and therefore
“threaten creeping repression” (Jones 1980, 139). With these concerns in
mind, a landmark attempt by Indonesian legal and human rights activists
to repeal the blasphemy law (Law 1/PNPS/1965 concerning the
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prevention of religious abuse, issued by presidential decree) was rejected
by the Constitutional Court in 2010 on populist majoritarian grounds of
national unity and religious harmony. This contentious decision seems
to legitimize Indonesia’s blasphemy regime and enables cases such as
the 2017 conviction of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who now wishes to be
called BTP rather than his Hakka Chinese alias Ahok.
Blasphemy, which in Indonesia usually refers to divergence from and
offence against Islam (Butt 2018, 407), can serve as a pretext for punish-
ments, convictions, and political reprisals premised on the need to pre-
serve public order. Blasphemy seems anachronistic, and yet the laws
passed in its name remain powerful tools for intervention into public
affairs, challenging democratic principles such as the right to free expres-
sion, tolerance, and diversity. The “conservative turn” in Indonesian Islam
since democratization (van Bruinessen 2013) partially explains the politi-
cal and judicial influence of groups such as the Indonesian Council of
Islamic Scholars (MUI) that publicly endorse blasphemy trials, issue con-
servative religious opinions ( fatwa), and claim to legitimately represent
the general Muslim public. Osman and Waikar (2018) see the Purnama
case as an indicator of the rise of far-right “uncivil” Islamist groups
playing on majoritarian insecurities about the ethnic Chinese and
ungodly leftist ideologies.
As with the Muslim majority in Indonesia, Buddhists in Thailand
account for at least 90% of the population, and yet they seem to be
trapped in a state of collective anxiety about the future (McCargo 2012,
1). The legitimacy of the Thai state rests on national myths about identity
and territory that converge as a form of “Thainess,” and Thai Buddhists in
such a highly charged political environment are prone to intolerance
toward Muslim and Christian minorities (McCargo 2012, 18). The per-
ceived threat of minority domination (by Chinese Christians in
Indonesia, Malay Muslims in Thailand) seems to be spreading, which par-
tially explains the prevalence of discursive crimes such as blasphemy in
ethnically divided countries. In this context, religious incitement leading
to prosecutions are often caused by political agents seeking to profit by
persuasion, deploying powerful “injustice frames” that highlight intolera-
ble offences such as blasphemy (George 2016, 11). The fact that some
people will inevitably, and often deliberately, find offense in processes
of free inquiry that may include ridicule seems insufficient reason to
limit public debates on religion. And yet blasphemy, which has gradually
shifted from protecting to policing belief, challenges the fundamental right
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to free thought and expression, and creates risks in diverse nations such as
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand.
Commenting on the persistence of blasphemy laws throughout the
world, David Lawton (1993, 10) suggests that “the relation between blas-
phemy and sedition is one structural reason why the law is slow to give up
the offence of blasphemy.” David Nash (2007, 10) finds that the history of
blasphemy follows a series of chronological shifts, from “conceptions of
the damaged community of believers, to the damaged social and political
peace, arriving finally at the wounded feelings and convictions of modern
individuals.” Peter Jones (1980, 131) suggests that the legal rationale for
blasphemy has developed in a similar way, beginning with efforts to crim-
inalize contemptuous utterances concerning the Deity. This evolved into a
campaign to give legal protection to the doctrines and institutions of the
established faith, followed by the need to protect the state against sedition.
The next iteration was to protect the fabric of society and public morality
against threats to public order, and then to protect individuals from that
which offends their religious sensibilities. We now seem to have entered
an era of “hate spin,” where religious incitement or “manufactured indig-
nation” is used as a political strategy that “exploits group identity to mobi-
lize supporters and coerce opponents” (George 2016, 4). One of the most
prolific hate spin agents in Indonesia is the hardline Islamic Defenders
Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), whose members specifically targeted
Purnama because of his minority status and his attempt to ban the FPI
during his tenure as governor of Jakarta (Telle 2018a).
David Lawton (1993, 3) contends that “blasphemy stands for whatever
society most abhors and has the power to prosecute,” although it seems
blasphemy is more of a reflection of what the powerful, speaking on
behalf of society, abhor, and fear. Some conservative Islamist organiza-
tions in Indonesia seek to gain political influence through street demon-
strations, legal actions as well as social media campaigns to defend
religion while also manufacturing outrage, thus increasing the potential
for the criminalization of blasphemy. The appropriation of blasphemy to
serve as an instrument of discipline and social control marks the end of
blasphemy as a literal crime against God or scripture. The repurposing
of religious offence by state and non-state organizations to impose order
and punish transgression should invoke Henry Lea’s (1906, 6) warning
about the “spiritual despotism” of those in power during the Spanish
Inquisition.
Indonesia is said to follow Dutch and Swiss models of religious
freedom that emphasize multi-religious accommodation and formal state
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recognition, as opposed to American and French separations of church and
state (Hefner 2016, 61). Where there is a strong libertarian tradition, such
as in the United States, it generally transpires that individual expression
can only be “prevented and punished when there is a strict causal connec-
tion between speech and subsequent action or harm” (Post 1988, 322). For
such restrictions to be imposed there must be a causal strictness that max-
imizes the amount of constitutionally protected free speech (Post 1988,
322). The First Amendment guarantees the highest threshold of free
speech in the world, and the Brandenburg test is used to determine
whether speech is directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless
action or violence (Calvert 2019).4 Pertinent to religious harmony and
offence, the basic rationale for U.S. First Amendment constitutional safe-
guards is that “line drawing between offensive and non-offensive speech is
too complex and subjective to provide rational distinctions” (Calvert and
Richards 2002, 679). One can tentatively conclude, therefore, that “it is
not for the government to dictate rules of civility and social mores of
speech interactions through laws that tell citizens what they can and
cannot say” (Calvert and Richards 2002, 679).
The necessity of religion to social stability and public morality, as
claimed by the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars and others, is
deeply ambiguous. Taking a comparative look at the United Kingdom,
in early the post-war period Lord Denning (1949, 46) sought to put an
end to medieval debates about blasphemy and public order by proclaiming
the offence “a dead letter.” An attempt by Lord Willis to enact a bill in
1979 abolishing blasphemy caused some members of UK House of
Lords to claim that blasphemy protects “deeply rooted values in
society,” without which society is eroded, nebulous and without
purpose, where “just anything goes” (Jones 1980, 132). Just anything
goes is reminiscent of the dilemma raised in Guy Thorne’s 1903 bestsell-
ing novel When It Was Dark. Thorne advanced the idea that the world’s
moral order depends on the divine revelation of Christianity (Kilcrease
2014). The basic plot of the book is that, on hearing the news that
Christ did not rise from the dead (the resurrection was a hoax), people sud-
denly found themselves in world without belief, a world with no moral
order, and wars, genocide and riots spontaneously broke out on a global
scale. This scale of spontaneous moral degeneration (“just anything
goes”) is clearly exaggerated, although there is a case to be made that
in the absence of religion one’s sense of community is diminished.
A contemporary argument by Cherian George (2016, 18) is “the myth
of spontaneous rage,” which focuses on the role of political agents and
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entrepreneurs seeking to incite violence or mobilize masses, and the ways
in which these agents profit when jurists, police and the media treat them
as genuine spokespersons of their communities. It follows that blasphemy
will remain a coercive tool, working alongside other forms of censure and
control, so long as churches, mosques, and synagogues have worshippers
and liturgical responsibilities that can be exploited. There are related con-
cerns that debates about offence and public order are not conducted in a
robust and neutral “marketplace of ideas,” as some jurists suggest, but
rather in a market that is skewed in favor of an entrenched power structure
and ideology (Ingber 1984, 85). The concept of blasphemy regimes intro-
duced below helps explain the particular nature of a country’s entrenched
power structure and ideology.
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY UNDER BLASPHEMY REGIMES
Religion has been a key unifying factor in Indonesia’s post-colonial devel-
opment, for instance taking the form of “godly nationalism” (an imagined
community of believers) in the 1940s (Menchik 2014, 594). By this
reading, the archetypal good Indonesian citizen is one who believes in
God and behaves in accordance with religious beliefs and values.
Liberal ideals have never been a dominant force in Indonesian politics
and statecraft. When President Suharto was in power (1966–1998), the
“smiling face” of Indonesian Islam was dominated by modernist dis-
courses that worked in tandem with the authoritarian developmental
state (van Bruinessen 2013, 1). In the early New Order period under
Suharto religion was used as a counterforce against communism and
leftist ideology, while strengthening the president’s political position
through co-optation and vote mobilization (Picard 2011, 14). With
atheism banned, all citizens were (and continue to be) obliged to follow
a state-sanctioned religion. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and
Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI) were enlisted to shore up
Muslim majority support for Suharto by balancing other core factions
such as the armed forces. Since democratization in 1998 the state has
become increasingly involved “in the firm demarcation of religious ortho-
doxy,” leading to truncated religious pluralism and the hardening of polit-
ical stances on religious deviance in Indonesia (Menchik 2014, 594).
In Muslim majority Indonesia there is no single, absolute religious
authority or arbiter, though allegations of blasphemy are often brought
to court by the MUI. As virtually the sole expert witness in cases of
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blasphemy in relation to Islam, police, prosecutors, and judges tend to
defer to the MUI, which was first established during the Suharto regime
to provide religious-based support for its authoritarian policies. The sub-
sequent post-1998 strengthening of the MUI as a quasi-official body, par-
ticularly under the administration of President Yudhoyono (2004–2014),
enables the MUI to claim special authority to deal with blasphemy
cases and define orthodoxy (Olle 2009, 106). The increasing prominence
of the MUI in elections under the current Joko Widodo administration
indicates the co-option of blasphemy by political actors with utilitarian
views of religion.
Stewart Fenwick (2017, 73) identifies the existence of a blasphemy
regime in Indonesia, which refers to a regime under which religious
offence is redirected toward the protection of institutions and the state,
rather than the protection of religious communities per se. To evaluate
Fenwick’s (2017) claims about a blasphemy regime that serves to buttress
the Indonesian state, appease religious factions within the country, and
limit the scope for public discourse by silencing religious critique, this
paper makes comparative reference to the “defamation regime” in
Thailand. According to David Streckfuss (2011, 24), a defamation
regime has the following features: frequent use of defamation-based
laws by the state; little reluctance on the part of police to charge, prosecu-
tors to try, and courts to accept defamation-based cases; little restraint on
the part of citizens in accusing others of defamation-based offenses; little
or no exemption from guilt allowed by courts; and weak constitutional
provisions ensuring freedom of speech. Each of these features is prevalent
in Indonesia, raising questions about judicial integrity and the application
of the law when blasphemy charges are brought to trial.
Frequent Use of Blasphemy Laws by the State
Considering the increasing salience of blasphemy cases, and the modest
performance of Islamic parties such as the National Awakening Party
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) in recent general elections, there
appears to be a paradox in Indonesian politics. One explanation is that
both secular and religious political parties defend religious beliefs and
engage in Islamization (Lorch 2019, 260), while risk aversion tends to
prevent parties from challenging the blasphemy laws. As Marcus
Mietzner (2018) suggests, the calculated Islamist mobilizations against
former governor Purnama, particularly the December 2, 2016 mass
Blasphemy and Judicial Legitimacy in Indonesia 9
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048319000427
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 12 Jun 2020 at 14:32:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
incident known as the “212 movement” involving hundreds of thousands
of protestors in Jakarta, have reopened debates about religious polarization
and the resurgence of populism in Indonesia. There is a risk of blasphemy
laws being used to silence political opponents, of blasphemy charges
being fabricated, and of religious groups exploiting blasphemy to justify
attacks on minorities, which tends to foster a hostile and intolerant polit-
ical environment (Freedom House 2010, 1–2).
Indonesia’s blasphemy provision is found in Article 156a of the Dutch-
inspired Criminal Code, which is based on Law 1/PNPS/1965 concerning
the prevention of religious abuse promulgated by Indonesia’s first presi-
dent Sukarno. Blasphemy was formalized during the Cold War period,
a volatile time in Indonesian politics when the Indonesian Communist
Party was on the rise and the spread of mysticism threatened the country’s
five (now six) officially recognized religions (Crouch 2012). According to
a study by Indonesia’s Setara Institute, Law 1/PNPS/1965 and its imple-
menting regulations concerning religion are held to be incongruent with
the Indonesian constitution (Halili 2016, 7–8). Article 156a of the
Criminal Code assigns up to 5 years imprisonment for those who deliber-
ately and publicly make a statement or perform an act that (a) constitutes
animosity toward, or dishonors, a religion adhered to in Indonesia, or (b)
is intended to prevent a person from adhering to any religion based on the
Almighty God (Butt and Lindsey 2012). While the question about fre-
quency of use is subjective, we know that there has been a rise in blas-
phemy cases reaching the Indonesian courts since 1998. A report by the
Indonesian Legal Resources Centre (Sihombing, Siti Aminah, and
Khoirul Roziqin 2012, 11) finds that under Suharto’s authoritarian
regime (1966–1998) there were only three blasphemy trials, whereas
Melissa Crouch (2017, 239) estimates more than 130 blasphemy convic-
tions between 1998 and 2012. Given the size of Indonesia, this is not a
prolific use of the blasphemy law, but it certainly marks an intensification
of cases in the post-Suharto era, and serves as a reminder of the power that
dormant laws can have when invoked by authorities or exploited by polit-
ically expedient organizations.
Little Reluctance to Accuse or Prosecute
There are risks that a constitution such as Indonesia’s empowers rather
than restrains the will of the majority, which “may deepen religious cleav-
ages and trigger widespread conflict” (Shah 2014, 262). The risks are very
10 Tyson
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048319000427
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 12 Jun 2020 at 14:32:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
real, although the limited number of blasphemy cases suggests some reluc-
tance by the police to pursue these cases, and perhaps the salience of alter-
native, extra-legal mechanisms for dealing with blasphemy disputes.
Blasphemy trials, when they do occur, are often politically motivated or
driven by the fear of repercussions if the police appear lenient or unwilling
to make arrests. It seems that the crime of blasphemy has replaced the
crime of subversion that was common during the authoritarian New
Order era under Suharto (Lindsey and Crouch 2013, 635). The police
appear to be caught between their formal protect and serve community
functions, and their more contentious role as morality defenders that
includes religious observance and the maintenance of national unity
(often at the expense of diversity).
The arrest of Donald Ignatius Suyanto, a chef living in Bali, on July 27,
2017 gives the general impression of the prevailing situation in Indonesia.
Suyanto, better known as Donald Bali since his arrest, stands accused of
blasphemy for posting a YouTube video that questions the shahada, a
statement of faith for Muslims that there is no God but Allah, and that
Muhammad is their messenger (Bali Post 2017). The arrest was prompted
by complaints made by bloggers that police and cybercrime units decided
(or felt pressured) to pursue, which shows that free expression, opinion,
and thought is always at risk when people claim religious offence. Here
we witness the powers of consensus and majoritarian coercion that
impede law enforcement and judicial propriety. Merlyna Lim (2017)
finds that judicial independence frequently gives way to public pressure
in Indonesia.
Vice President and MUI chairman Ma’ruf Amin’s fatwa against
Purnama accused the former governor of insulting ( penghinaan) the
Qur’an. The police may have initially been reluctant to arrest Purnama
given his notoriety and strong political connection to President Joko
Widodo, and there was never a consensus as to how to proceed, although
after interviewing 29 witnesses and 39 experts from various fields, formal
police charges were issued by Ari Dono Sukmanto, Head of Criminal
Investigations. Mass protests in Jakarta led by the Islamic Defenders
Front and the Movement to Safeguard the MUI’s Fatwa were likely a
key factor behind the police decision (Singghi 2019, 31). Tomsa (2017,
152) contends that “politically motivated blasphemy charges” were
brought against Purnama by a police force seemingly bowing to public
and elite pressure.5 President Joko Widodo worried that the Muslim back-
lash against Purnama would affect his own popularity and electability.
Purnama was thus a necessary political sacrifice, and in a bid to shore
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up political support from Islamic mass organizations and political parties
ahead of the general election in April 2019, Ma’ruf Amin was handed the
vice presidency.
No Exemption from Guilt
Charlotte Setijadi (2017) found at least 106 blasphemy prosecutions in
Indonesia since 2005, with a near-100% conviction rate in blasphemy
cases that mainly punish members of a religious minority. An account
of the legal representation provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid
Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) to citizens facing communal
harassment and state actions since the democratic transition in 1998
shows that, in blasphemy cases involving religious offences covered by
Article 156a, the LBH has yet to win an acquittal (Lindsey and Crouch
2013, 634). It is argued that the LBH are engaged in a politically-
charged and theatrical form of cause lawyering, where public interest lit-
igation is used to defend religious freedom (Lindsey and Crouch 2013,
636). In the case of Abdullah, an elderly Muslim farmer living in East
Lombok with an overactive imagination, the District Court in Selong
passed down a supposedly lenient 1-year prison sentence that took into
account his advanced age and willingness to repent (Telle 2018b).
Abdullah is guilty of thought crimes and utterances that fall under the
label of blasphemy (he claimed to receive revelations from the Angel
Gabriel), and while mitigating circumstances were accepted by the
court, there can be no exemption from guilt. Similar conclusions can be
drawn from the 2018 Medan District Court decision to sentence
Meliana, a Chinese Buddhist housewife, to 18 months in prison for her
complaints about the volume of the adhan, or Muslim call to prayer
(Suryadinata 2019).
Weak Constitutional Provisions Ensuring Freedom of Speech
Free speech is covered by the Second Amendment to the Indonesian
Constitution passed in 2000 that created a special charter of human
rights inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Articles
28E and 28I of the amended constitution contain religious freedom provi-
sions as well as restrictions on rights and freedoms that can be imposed in
accordance with religious values (Faiz 2016). While Article 29 guarantees
freedom of worship for all citizens, there is no place for non-believers and
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thus no real freedom from religion. Non-believers and wrong-believers
(deviants) are not afforded the same legal protections as true believers
in Indonesia, thus raising concerns about outsider jurisprudence, although
everyone is equally vulnerable to accusations of blasphemy. For this
reason, a group of civil society organizations in Indonesia brought a
case to the Constitutional Court in 2009 in the hope of abolishing
Article 156a of the Criminal Code and restoring judicial propriety. This
challenge, and subsequent cases heard by the Constitutional Court con-
cerning the rights of Shia Muslims and Ahmadiyyah, failed to abolish
criminal blasphemy, which is indicative of the salience of religious defer-
ence as well as deep suspicions between religious groups (Crouch 2016).
THE 2009–2010 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW
In 2009 the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH), along with prominent
legal and human rights organizations in Indonesia such as Imparsial,
ELSAM, and the Setara Institute, initiated a judicial review of Law 1/
PNPS/1965 and Criminal Code Article 156a. The legal applicants
argued that blasphemy provisions contravene the constitutional right to
religious freedom in Indonesia (Crouch 2012, 1). In a 2011 Amicus pub-
lished by human rights experts from Cairo and London, Law 1/PNPS/
1965 concerning the prevention of religious abuse is determined to be
“fundamentally incompatible with Indonesia’s obligations under interna-
tional human rights law” (Amicus 2011, 3).6 Article 156a, along with
all other criminal code provisions preventing the abuse of religion,
should be repealed because they violate freedom of expression, freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, and equality before the law
(Amicus 2011, 4).
Since its establishment in 2003 the Constitutional Court of Indonesia
has been an activist court, seeking to strengthen democracy by improving
oversight and conducting judicial review in a highly public forum,
although the Court faces hostility from politicians and has been forced
to make strategic adjustments to “soften the impact of its decisions”
(Butt 2012, 108). The Court’s contentious decision to retain Article
156a helps legitimize Indonesia’s blasphemy regime at the expense of
fair and impartial law enforcement. The 2010 decision reveals an “over-
arching sense of obligation to respect religion” as well as signs of “weak-
ness” (Fenwick 2017, 185) in public and judicial reasoning in Indonesia.
The Constitutional Court heard questions about freedom of religion and
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the competency of the state, and some witnesses shared the Amici’s posi-
tion that, with very few exceptions (incitement being the most prominent),
it is not for the government to tell their citizens what they can or cannot
say, think or believe. Since 2010 the charge of blasphemy has been
reviewed a number of times by the Constitutional Court, most recently
in 2018 when the Court rejected a petition by members of the
Ahmadiyyah community to abolish Article 156a.
Franz Magnis Suseno, a well-known Jesuit priest and professor of phi-
losophy at STF Driyarkara, contends that difference of belief is not blas-
phemy, that religious deviance is relative, a matter of opinion not fact, that
rests outside of the competence of the court and state authorities
(Constitutional Court of Indonesia 2010, 253). In a warning against the
repressive nature of blasphemy laws, Suseno argues that fringe groups
such as Jehovah’s Witnesses (and for that matter the Ahmadiyya sect)
have the right to believe whatever they wish to believe regardless of the
offence caused to Catholic or Sunni majorities, or any nominal idea of
majoritarian consensus. As Kari Telle (2018b, 371) points out, the unan-
swered (and probably unanswerable) theological question about the “true”
form of Islam has divided Muslims throughout Islamic history, but in
Indonesia today the civil courts “are increasingly adjudicating such theo-
logical disputes.” Given these legal trends, it is worth recalling Henry
Lea’s (1906, 6) historical conception of “spiritual despotism” that arises
when the power of religion is misused for political purposes, or turned
into an instrument of oppression. According to the Brandenburg test in
the United States, courts do not have the competence to adjudicate on
matters of religious truth or deviance, which means that jurists should
not attempt to draw the lines that separate blasphemy from inquiry, ridi-
cule, or doubt.
Contrary to Franz Magnis Suseno’s interpretation, the majority of
expert witness submissions to the Constitutional Court took the pluralist
position that more protection for all religious groups is in fact needed.
But the problem of adjudication has not been resolved. It remains to be
seen how exactly a judge or a cleric or a politician can claim to know,
with the certainty of truth, when religious believers deviate from the
central tenets of their faith, whether this deviation is deliberate or acciden-
tal, to what extent deviation can be considered a form of injury to commu-
nities of believers, and on what grounds people are incited to violence
(Fenwick 2017, 63). Prominent defenders of the blasphemy law such as
the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI) cite well-rehearsed
arguments about the need to protect society and public morals, which is
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reminiscent of the exaggerated UK House of Lords claim in 1979 that
blasphemy protects “deeply rooted values in society,” without which
“just anything goes” (Jones 1980, 132). The MUI claim is that the abol-
ishment of Article 156a will lead to levels of religious deviance that
will likely cause extraordinary turmoil and strife, and possibly even the
destruction of the public order (Fenwick 2017, 64). It is hard to
imagine a religious justification for the deliberate and willful destruction
of the public order, which suggests the MUI had something else in
mind when it made its submission to the Constitutional Court. We
know that since the democratic transition in 1998 the MUI has been
seeking to monopolize its position as the leading fatwa-maker in
Indonesia, which includes the authoritative (or final) say over “correct”
forms of Islamic belief (Hasyim 2015).
THE 2016–2017 BLASPHEMY TRIAL OF BASUKI TJAHAJA
PURNAMA
In September 2012 Joko Widodo (who goes by the nickname Jokowi) and
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama were elected as governor and deputy governor of
Jakarta. When Jokowi cut his term short to run for (and win) the presi-
dency in 2014, Purnama, a former mining consultant who began his polit-
ical career in the remote island of Belitung, inherited the office of
governor of Jakarta. In November 2014, 1 month after Jokowi was
sworn in as president, Purnama joined Jokowi and many other national
political leaders on the popular Metro TV program Mata Najwa, during
an episode branded as a “celebration” (merayakan) of Indonesia.
Purnama was in the spotlight for one segment of the show and was
given the chance to ask former president Megawati Sukarnoputri a
series of soft questions about current political trends. He quickly went
off script, asking Megawati why she backed Jokowi’s presidential bid,
when she knew full well that Jokowi’s success would mean placing a
non-Muslim leader of Chinese descent in the governor’s seat, a maneuver
that was politically risky for her and was quite unpopular in many parts of
the country.7 Purnama suggested that, given Megawati’s standing as a
respected elder and key political figure in contemporary Indonesia, she
could defend his inauguration by giving some context to the debate and
helping the public understand the history of Indonesian nationalism and
pluralism, but his appeal fell on deaf ears.8
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The contentious rise of Purnama was met by a political backlash insti-
gated by some national elites who positioned themselves as defenders of
“indigenous” ( pribumi) Indonesians, in what Leo Suryadinata (2017) calls
the re-emergence of pribumi-ism. The numerical supremacy of Indonesia’s
pribumi population is not enough prevent the spread of anxieties and
rumors about the latent threat of ethnic Chinese political and economic
dominance (Cochrane 2014).9 Despite the personalized attacks made
against his identity and character, Purnama maintained high approval
ratings throughout his term in office. In September 2016, during the
gubernatorial election campaign, a YouTube video emerged showing
Purnama addressing residents of Pramuka Island just off the coast of
Jakarta. Purnama warned people not to be deceived (dibohongi) by
those using Al-Maidah verse 51 to undermine his candidacy. This is a
Quranic verse that can be interpreted as forbidding non-Muslims from
leading Muslims, meaning that Jakarta’s Muslims cannot vote for
Purnama, and the verse focuses on the unity and loyalty of the Muslim
community (ummah).
In November 2017, an academic named Buni Yani was sentenced to 18
months in prison for uploading a 30 second clip from the blasphemous
Purnama video, as well as circulating an edited transcription of
Purnama’s speech that led to public outcry and was found to constitute
hate speech by a district court in Bandung, West Java (Lazuardi 2017).
In response to Buni Yani’s edited video and transcript, the provincial
branch of the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars in South Sumatra
filed a police report about Purnama’s supposedly blasphemous comments
in 2016, and this charge was endorsed by mass religious organizations
throughout the country, including the militant Islamic Defenders Front,
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and Muhammadiyah youth groups (Gunn
2018). Mass organizations such as these are known to be influential
power brokers in democratic Indonesia, willing and able to weaponize reli-
gion to affect political outcomes (Nastiti and Ratri 2018). The supposed
insult to Islam and threat to Muslim unity came from Purnama, a
Chinese Christian double minority who is a close associate of President
Jokowi and has spent most of his political career fighting corruption,
reforming bureaucracies, and insisting upon transparency in government.
President Jokowi’s rivals sought to turn the 2016 Jakarta elections into
a proxy battle for the presidential race in 2019 (Mietzner 2017). Former
president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono endorsed his son Agus, while pres-
idential aspirant Prabowo Subianto backed Anies Baswedan in the race
against Purnama. Faced with the very real prospect of Purnama securing
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a popular mandate to govern Jakarta and then running for vice president in
2019, Islamists seized the opportunity to attack Purnama for his alleged
blasphemy (Mietzner 2018, 272). When blasphemy charges were
brought against Purnama for his Al-Maidah reference, he already had a
reputation as an abrasive, at times even foul-mouthed speaker, though
his performance as governor earned him widespread respect in middle-
and upper-class districts of Jakarta, as well as international plaudits
(Hatherell and Welsh 2017). Part of Purnama’s reform agenda included
an urban flood prevention system in Jakarta that required large-scale evic-
tions of poor families living near riverbanks, which led Saskia Schafer
(2017) to conclude that the tensions surrounding Purnama are explained
by the complex interplay of grievances, piety, and anger. Some claim
that the former governor’s aggressive enforcement of evictions benefits
middle-class constituents and property developers while reinforcing the
structural disadvantage of the poor and compounding their sense of
betrayal (Wilson 2016).
Data from professional polling agencies such as Indikator and Saiful
Mujani suggested that Purnama was going to win the first round of elec-
tions in February 2017 despite the ongoing blasphemy trial, which turned
out to be true, but that he would lose the second-round runoff because
voters who supported Agus Yudhoyono (the losing candidate) in the
first round would migrate to Purnama’s rivals. Anies Baswedan and his
deputy seem to have won the electoral runoff by capitalizing on anxieties
about electing a non-Muslim, ethnically Chinese governor and by making
extravagant spending promises to improve social welfare in Jakarta
(Anindya 2017). Though difficult to quantify, the blasphemy trial cer-
tainly undermined Purnama’s campaign and worked in his opponent’s
favor, particularly during the second-round electoral runoff that took
place between February and April 2017.10
A survey experiment conducted by Nathanael Sumaktoyo (2017) during
the Jakarta elections determined that the most significant decline in
support for Purnama occurred when voters were reminded that Purnama
is a Chinese Indonesian minority. The findings suggest that Purnama’s
ethnicity is more politically significant than his religion. Sumaktoyo’s ran-
domized sampling of voters in Jakarta shows that being a Christian did not
significantly impact on the levels of support for Purnama, although this
survey did not account for the likely vote swing against a blasphemous
evangelical Christian, which is a different proposition altogether.
After losing the gubernatorial election Purnama was given a 2-year
prison sentence by the North Jakarta District Court, which raises two
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questions related to Indonesia’s Criminal Code. First, in what way did
Purnama’s reference to Al-Maidah verse 51 constitute animosity toward
Islam? Second, how can it be determined that his statement was intended
to prevent someone from adhering to Islam? If the procedural integrity of
the Indonesian judiciary is to be maintained, at least one of these contra-
ventions must have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There is little
in the trial transcripts or head judge Dwiarso Budi Santiarto’s final verdict
that suggests these legal criteria have been definitively met. But even if
one believes that this procedural test has been met, it still does not
resolve the substantive question as to whether there should have been a
trial of this kind in the first place.
In a review of 37 blasphemy cases involving charges under Article 156a,
the Indonesian Legal Resources Centre raises serious concerns about legal
uncertainty and the improper application of the law by judges who cannot
remain neutral in cases involving the desecration ( penodaan) of religion
(Sihombing, Siti Aminah, and Khoirul Roziqin 2012, 78). An updated
study of 63 blasphemy cases, including 11 prosecutions from 2014, high-
lights the intervention of religious organizations such as the MUI and the
tendency of jurists to base their judgments on information provided by
these organizations—the same religious authorities who issue fatwa in
the first place—thus ensuring a guilty verdict (Aminah and Roziqin
2015). Andhika Prayoga’s (2015) analysis of the legal proceedings in
two blasphemy cases from Sulawesi and Sumatra casts doubt upon the pro-
fessional conduct of judges, and the author concludes that judges in blas-
phemy cases are heavily swayed by their private religious beliefs and by
the fatwa issued by clerics. It is difficult for judges to resist the social pres-
sure to prosecute, and nearly impossible for them to remain objective in
blasphemy trials. These conclusions are reinforced by the Indonesian
Institute for the Independent Judiciary, who analyzed 27 blasphemy
cases and found judicial institutions do not act in a neutral and objective
manner, leading to mistakes in law enforcement, erroneous legal interpre-
tation, and infringements of fair trial principles (Cohen 2018, 99).
CONCLUSION
Blasphemy has been examined in this paper as a discursive crime that is
politically motivated and can lead to serious abuses of power. With refer-
ence to the trial of former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known
as Ahok, this paper demonstrates that blasphemy charges tend to
18 Tyson
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048319000427
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 12 Jun 2020 at 14:32:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
undermine judicial legitimacy and influence electoral outcomes in
Indonesia. The political revival of blasphemy as a punishable crime
places near-impossible expectations on jurists, politicians, and clerics
who are asked to safeguard religion by imposing what appear to be arbi-
trary limits on freedom of expression. Law enforcement faces considerable
pressure from conservative Islamist groups claiming to speak on behalf of
Indonesia’s Muslim majority while bidding for power, parliamentary rep-
resentation, and popularity. Consequently, citizens in Indonesia risk facing
the double burden of curtailments to their free expression as well as
restrictions on their religious beliefs under the current blasphemy regime.
In this paper, judicial legitimacy in Indonesia is tested against interna-
tional standards and conventions, with a focus on judicial propriety rather
than the level of majoritarian support for court decisions in blasphemy
cases. There is compelling evidence that judgments rendered in politicized
blasphemy trials are not impartial and independent (Sihombing, Siti
Aminah, and Khoirul Roziqin 2012; Aminah and Roziqin 2015;
Prayoga 2015; Halili 2016; Cohen 2018). When discursive transgressions
of a blasphemous nature are reported to police, there are significant ambi-
guities of meaning and intent. Politically active Islamist groups and
authorities often seek to legitimize blasphemy charges under the pretense
that punishments preserve public order and religious harmony. Blasphemy
laws are constructed and pressed into service to maintain a prevailing
socio-political order constructed in majoritarian terms, in which
Indonesia’s minorities are partial citizens and Islam is made representative
of a presumed conservative majority. Guilty parties are prosecuted to
secure outcomes that have little to do with the crime, and in most cases
the crime itself lacks any intent (mens rea) or clear evidence of harm,
raising the specter of punitive measures for victimless crimes.
The conditions under which blasphemy laws are pressed into service in
democracies such as Indonesia are related to political power calculations
and electoral opportunities, as well as levels of recognition afforded to
groups such as the conservative Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars
(MUI) that influence judicial processes. Testimony from the MUI,
whose chairman Ma’ruf Amin is now the vice president of the Republic
of Indonesia, heavily sways legal and public opinion, and is seldom
refuted or contradicted by authorities. While the MUI and their supporters
may feel vindicated, the outcomes of blasphemy trials place significant
strain on the judicial system and democratic process.
If international legal standards of due process and propriety are applied,
as called for by Indonesian groups such as the Legal Aid Institute (LBH),
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Imparsial, ELSAM, and the Setara Institute, one finds reasonable doubt,
uncertainty of intent, and inconclusive evidence of harm and insult in
the Purnama case. Despite the ruling of the North Jakarta District Court
in the Purnama case, and the landmark 2010 decision of the
Constitutional Court to retain the blasphemy law, one could reasonably
argue that Purnama’s campaign appeal against the misuse of Al-Maidah
verse 51 was in fact an effort to preserve (not undermine) the integrity
of the Quranic verse, and was in no way a malicious attack against reli-
gious beliefs, believers, or institutions. Indeed, some senior members of
the Islamic mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama have argued against
Purnama’s blasphemy conviction. The prosecutor’s claim that
Purnama’s reference to the Quran injured Muslims and threatened to
undermine public order is difficult to prove beyond doubt, and the ques-
tion of voter preferences and conduct in elections is the mandate of the
Election Commission, not the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars.
These contradictions have yet to be resolved, and the 2019 proposal in
the House of Representatives to revise the Dutch-era Criminal Code is
set to expand the scope for blasphemy charges in Indonesia, meaning
observers are likely to witness even more problematic trials such as
Purnama’s in the coming years.
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NOTES
1. North Jakarta District Court Decision Number 1537/Pid.B/2016/PN.Jkt Utr.
2. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s Instagram post is available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/
BswNAD5HdhH/.
3. The key indicators used by the U.S. Commission on International Religion to score countries are
freedoms (of expression, belief ), principle of legality, severity of penalty, discrimination, state religion
protections, forum limitations, and hierarchy of the law.
4. In reference to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the 1969 Brandenburg versus Ohio case.
5. Similar trends have been observed in Pakistan, where there are reports of police facing public
pressure and “repercussions from violent and restless Islamic mobs” if they fail to make arrests follow-
ing accusations of blasphemy (Holzaepfel 2014, 597).
6. The Amicus brief on Constitutional Court of Indonesia case number 140/PUU-VII/2009 con-
cerning the prevention of religious abuse was jointly produced by Article 19, Amnesty
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International, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies.
7. YouTube, “Mata Najwa: Merayakan Indonesia 2014 [Mata Najwa: Celebrate Indonesia 2014]”,
November 22, 2014, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKSoPki7sss.
8. YouTube, “Mata Najwa.” There are multiple YouTube clips of the November 22, 2014 Mata
Najwa program, but I could only find one video (with poor audio quality) that did not remove
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama critical question about his ethnicity. Purnama’s televised statement, in full,
reads as follows: Ini yang masalah sekarang, karna banyak “publik” [orang] pikir belum saatnya
orang turunan Tionghoa, non-Muslim lagi mimpin Ibu kota [Jakarta]. Berarti Ibu [Megawati]
pasti tahu, kalau Pak Jokowi Ibu yakin jadi presiden, pasti saya jadi gubernur. Nah, pandangan
Ibu tentang nasionalisme ini perlu, mungkin Ibu ceritakan supaya orang bisa mengerti, minimal
belain saya baru dilantik.
9. Jemma Purdey (2006) identified a pattern of violence against Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese com-
munities, who since the early settlements of traders and merchants from provinces such as
Guangzhou and Fujian have suffered because of their symbolic otherness (languages, religions,
customs), and their disproportionate control of private business capital.
10. The pairing of Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno won convincingly, with 58% of the vote
during the second-round runoff in April 2017.
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